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Abstract
Breaking cybersecurity events are shared
across a range of websites, including secu-
rity blogs (FireEye, Kaspersky, etc.), in addi-
tion to social media platforms such as Face-
book and Twitter. In this paper, we investi-
gate methods to analyze the severity of cyber-
security threats based on the language that is
used to describe them online. A corpus of
6,000 tweets describing software vulnerabili-
ties is annotated with authors’ opinions toward
their severity. We show that our corpus sup-
ports the development of automatic classifiers
with high precision for this task. Furthermore,
we demonstrate the value of analyzing users’
opinions about the severity of threats reported
online as an early indicator of important soft-
ware vulnerabilities. We present a simple, yet
effective method for linking software vulner-
abilities reported in tweets to Common Vul-
nerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) in the Na-
tional Vulnerability Database (NVD). Using
our predicted severity scores, we show that it
is possible to achieve a Precision@50 of 0.86
when forecasting high severity vulnerabilities,
significantly outperforming a baseline that is
based on tweet volume. Finally we show how
reports of severe vulnerabilities online are pre-
dictive of real-world exploits.1
1 Introduction
Software vulnerabilities are flaws in computer sys-
tems that leave users open to attack; vulnerabili-
ties are generally unknown at the time a piece of
software is first published, but are gradually iden-
tified over time. As new vulnerabilities are discov-
ered and verified they are assigned CVE numbers
(unique identifiers), and entered into the National
Vulnerability Database (NVD).2 To help prioritize
1Our code and data are available at https://github.com/viczong/
cybersecurity threat severity analysis.
2
https://nvd.nist.gov/
Figure 1: Example tweet discussing the dirty copy-on-
write (COW) security vulnerability in the Linux kernel.
response efforts, vulnerabilities in the NVD are as-
signed severity scores using the Common Vulner-
ability and Scoring System (CVSS). As the rate of
discovered vulnerabilities has increased in recent
years,3 the need for efficient identification and pri-
oritization has become more crucial. However, it
is well known that a large time delay exists be-
tween the time a vulnerability is first publicly dis-
closed to when it is published in the NVD; a re-
cent study found that the median delay between
the time a vulnerability is first reported online and
the time it is published in the NVD is seven days;
also, 75% of threats are first disclosed online giv-
ing attackers time to exploit the vulnerability.4
In this paper we present the first study of
whether natural language processing techniques
can be used to analyze users’ opinions about the
severity of software vulnerabilities reported on-
line. We present a corpus of 6,000 tweets anno-
tated with opinions toward threat severity, and em-
pirically demonstrate that this dataset supports au-
tomatic classification. Furthermore, we propose
a simple, yet effective method for linking soft-
ware vulnerabilities reported on Twitter to entries
in the NVD, using CVEs found in linked URLs.
We then use our threat severity analyzer to con-
duct a large-scale study to validate the accuracy
of users’ opinions online against experts’ severity
3
https://www.cvedetails.com/browse-by-date.php
4
https://www.recordedfuture.com/vulnerability-disclosure-delay/
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ratings (CVSS scores) found in the NVD. Finally,
we show that our approach can provide an early
indication of vulnerabilities that result in real ex-
ploits in the wild as measured by the existence of
Symantec virus signatures associated with CVEs;
we also show how our approach can be used to ret-
rospectively identify Twitter accounts that provide
reliable warnings about severe vulnerabilities.
Recently there has been increasing interest in
developing NLP tools to identify cybersecurity
events reported online, including denial of ser-
vice attacks, data breaches and more (Ritter et al.,
2015; Chang et al., 2016; Chambers et al., 2018).
Our proposed approach in this paper builds on this
line of work by evaluating users opinions toward
the severity of cybersecurity threats.
Prior work has also explored forecasting soft-
ware vulnerabilities that will be exploited in the
wild (Sabottke et al., 2015). Features included
structured data sources (e.g., NVD), in addition to
the volume of tweets mentioning a list of 31 key-
words. Rather than relying on a fixed set of key-
words, we analyze message content to determine
whether the author believes a vulnerability is se-
vere. As discussed by Sabottke et al. (2015), meth-
ods that rely on tracking keywords and message
volume are vulnerable to adversarial attacks from
Twitter bots or sockpuppet accounts (Solorio et al.,
2013). In contrast, our method is somewhat less
prone to such attacks; by extracting users’ opin-
ions expressed in individual tweets, we can track
the provenance of information associated with our
forecasts for display to an analyst, who can then
determine whether or not they trust the source of
information.
2 Analyzing Users’ Opinions Toward the
Severity of Cybersecurity Threats
Given a tweet t and named entity e, our goal is to
predict whether or not there is a serious cybersecu-
rity threat towards the entity based on context. For
example, given the context in Figure 2, we aim at
predicting the severity level towards adobe flash
player. We define an author’s perceived severity
toward a threat using three criteria: (1) does the
author believe that their followers should be wor-
ried about the threat? (2) is the vulnerability easily
exploitable? and (3) could the threat affect a large
number of users? If one or more of these criteria
are met, then we consider the threat to be severe.
2.1 Data Collection
To collect tweets describing cybersecurity events
for annotation, we tracked the keywords “ddos”
and “vulnerability” from Dec 2017 to July 2018
using the Twitter API. We then used the Twitter
tagging tool described by Ritter et. al. (2011) to
extract named entities,5 retaining tweets that con-
tain at least one named entity. To cover as many
linguistic variations as possible, we used Jaccard
similarity with a threshold of 0.7 to identify and
remove duplicated tweets with same date.6
2.2 Mechanical Turk Annotation
We paid crowd workers on Amazon Mechanical
Turk to annotate our dataset. The annotation was
performed in two phases; during the first phase,
we asked workers to determine whether or not the
tweet describes a cybersecurity threat toward a tar-
get entity, in the second phase the task is to de-
termine whether the author of the tweet believes
the threat is severe; only tweets that were judged
to express a threat were annotated in the second
phase. Each HIT contained 10 tweets to be anno-
tated; workers were paid $0.20 per HIT. In pilot
studies we tried combining these two annotations
into a single task, but found low inter-rater agree-
ment, especially for the threat severity judgments,
motivating the need for separation of the annota-
tion procedure into two tasks.
Figure 2 shows a portion of the annotation inter-
face presented to workers during the second phase
of annotation. Details of each phase are described
below, and summarized in Table 1.
Figure 2: A portion of the annotation interface shown
to MTurk workers during the threat severity annotation.
Threat existence annotation: Not all tweets in
our dataset describe cybersecurity threats, for ex-
ample many tweets discuss different senses of the
5
https://github.com/aritter/twitter nlp
6We sampled a dataset of 6,000 tweets to annotate.
Anno. Tweets Total
1st Annotation (5 workers per tweet) 2nd Annotation (10 workers per tweet)
Label # Tweets % Label # Tweets %
6,000
With threat
2,543
42.4
Severe threat 506 25.7
(1,966 for 2nd anno.) Moderate threat 1,460 74.3
Without threat 3,457 57.6 /
Table 1: Number of annotated tweets with break-down percentages to each category. In 1st annotation, a tweet
contains a threat if more than 3 workers vote for it. In 2nd annotation, a threat is severe if more than 6 workers
agree on it. Number of workers cut-offs are determined by comparing to our golden annotations in pilot studies.
word “vulnerability” (e.g., “It’s OK to show vul-
nerability”). During the first phase of our annota-
tion process, workers judged whether or not there
appears to be a cybersecurity threat towards the
target entity based on the content of the corre-
sponding tweet. We provide workers with 3 op-
tions: the tweet indicates (a) a cybersecurity threat
towards given entity, (b) a threat, but not towards
the target entity, or (c) no cybersecurity threat.
Each tweet is annotated by 5 workers.
Threat severity annotation: In the second phase,
we collect all tweets judged to contain threats by
more than 3 workers in the first phase and anno-
tated them for severity. 1,966 tweets were selected
out of 6,000.7 For each tweet we provided work-
ers with 3 options: the tweet contains (a) a severe,
(b) a moderate or (c) no threat toward the target
entity. During our pilot study, we found this to
be a more challenging annotation task, therefore
we increased the number of annotators per tweet
to 10 workers, which we found to improve agree-
ment with our expert judgments.
Inter-annotator agreement: During both phases,
we monitored the quality of workers’ annotations
using their agreement with each other. We cal-
culated the annotation agreement of each worker
against the majority vote of other workers. We
manually removed data from workers who have
an agreement less than 0.5, filling in missing an-
notations with new workers. We also manually
removed data from workers who answered either
uniformly or randomly for all HITs.
Agreement with expert judgments: To validate
the quality of our annotated corpus we compared
the workers’ aggregated annotations against our
own expert annotations. We independently anno-
tated 150 randomly sampled tweets, 61 tweets of
7We further deduplicate pairs of tweets where the longest
common subsequence covers the majority of the text con-
tents. During deduplication all hashtags and URLs were re-
moved and digits were replaced with 0.
which are marked as containing severe or moder-
ate threats. For threat existence annotation, we
observe a 0.66 value of Cohen’s κ (Artstein and
Poesio, 2008) between the expert judgements and
majority vote of 5 crowd workers. Although our
threat severity annotation task may require some
cybersecurity knowledge for accurate judgment,
we still achieve 0.52 Cohen κ agreement by com-
paring majority vote from 10 workers with expert
annotations.
2.3 Analyzing Perceived Threat Severity
Using the annotated corpus described in Sec-
tion 2.2, we now develop classifiers that detect
threats reported online and analyze users’ opin-
ions toward their severity. Specifically, given a
named entity and tweet, 〈e, t〉, our goal is to es-
timate the probability the tweet describes a cyber-
security threat towards the entity, pthreat(y|〈e, t〉)
and also the probability that the threat is severe,
psevere(y|〈e, t〉). In this section, we describe the
details of these classifiers and evaluate their per-
formance.
We experimented with two baselines to detect
reports of cyberthreats and analyze opinions about
their severity: logistic regression using bag-of-
ngram features, and 1D convolutional neural net-
works. In the sections below we describe the input
representations and details of these two models.
Logistic regression: We use logistic regression as
our first baseline model for both classifiers. In-
put representations are bag-of-ngram features ex-
tracted from the entire tweet content. Example
features are presented in Table 4. We use context
windows of size 2, 3 and 4 to extract features. We
map extracted n-grams that occur only once to a
〈UNK〉 token. In all our experiments, we replace
named entities with a special token 〈TARGET〉;
this helps prevent our models from biasing to-
wards specific entities that appear in our training
corpus. All digits are replaced with 0.
Convolutional neural networks: We also exper-
imented with 1D convolutional neural networks
(Collobert et al., 2011; Kim, 2014). Given a tweet,
the model first applies convolutional operations on
input sequences with various filters of different
sizes. The intermediate representations for each
filter are aggregated using max-pooling over time,
followed by a fully connected layer. We choose
convolution kernel sizes to be 3, 4 and 5-grams
with 100 filters for each. We minimize cross-
entropy loss using Adam (Kingma and Ba, 2015);
the learning rate is set to 0.001 with a batch size of
1 and 5 epochs.
Word embeddings: We train our own cyberse-
curity domain word embeddings based on GloVe
(Pennington et al., 2014), as 39.7% of our to-
kens are treated as OOV words in GloVe pre-
trained Twitter embeddings. We used a corpus of
609,470 cybersecurity-related tweets (described in
Section 2.1) as our training corpus. The dimension
of word embeddings is 50. Table 2 shows nearest
neighbors for some sampled cybersecurity terms
based on the learned embeddings.
During network training, we initialize word em-
bedding layer with our own embeddings. We
initialize tokens not in our trained embeddings
by randomized vectors with uniform distribution
from -0.01 to 0.01. We fine-tune the word embed-
ding layer during training.
Token Nearest Neighbors
#ddos attacks, ddos, datacenter-insider, attack,
#cyberattack
#hackers hackers, sec cyber, #blackberryz00,
#malware, #hacking
threats defenses, cyberrisk, #cybersecurity,
threat, #iot-based
vulnerability risk, ..., #vulnerability, strength, critical
Table 2: Nearest neighbors to some cybersecurity re-
lated tokens in our trained word embeddings. Embed-
dings are trained by using GloVe. Similar tokens are
sorted by cosine similarity scores.
2.3.1 Experimental Setup
For threat existence classification, we randomly
split our dataset of 6,000 tweets into a training set
of 4,000 tweets, a development set of 1,000 tweets,
and test set of 1,000 tweets. For the threat sever-
ity classifier, we only used data from 2nd phase of
annotation. This dataset consists of 1,966 tweets
that were judged by the mechanical turk work-
ers to describe a cybersecurity threat towards the
target entity. We randomly split this dataset into
a training set of 1,200 tweets, a development set
of 300 tweets, and a test set of 466 tweets. We
collapsed the three annotated labels into two cat-
egories based on whether or not the author ex-
presses an opinion that the threat towards the tar-
get entity is severe.
2.3.2 Results
Threat existence classifier: The logistic regres-
sion baseline has good performance at identify-
ing threats, which we found to be a relatively easy
task; area under the precision-recall curve (AUC)
on the development and test set presented in Ta-
ble 5. This enables accurate detection of trending
threats online by tracking cybersecurity keywords
using the Twitter streaming API, following an ap-
proach that is similar to prior work on entity-based
Twitter event detection (Ritter et al., 2012; Zhou
et al., 2014; Wei et al., 2015). Table 3 presents an
example of threats detected using this procedure
on Nov. 22, 2018.8
Threat severity classifier: Figure 3 shows pre-
cision recall curves for the threat severity classi-
fiers. Logistic regression with bag-of-ngram fea-
tures provides a strong baseline for this task. Ta-
ble 4 presents examples of high-weight features
from the logistic regression model. These features
often intuitively indicate severe threats, e.g. “crit-
ical vulnerability”, “a massive”, “million”, etc.
Without much hyperparameter tuning on the de-
velopment set, the convolutional neural network
consistently achieves higher precision at the same
level of recall as compared to logistic regression.
We summarize the performance of our threat exis-
tence and severity classifiers in Table 5.
3 Forecasting Severe Cybersecurity
Threats
In Section 2 we presented methods that can accu-
rately detect threats reported online and analyze
users’ opinions about their severity. We now ex-
plore the effectiveness of this model for forecast-
ing. Specifically, we aim to answer the following
questions: (1) To what extent do users’ opinions
about threat severity expressed online align with
expert judgments? (2) Can these opinions provide
an early indicator to help prioritize threats based
8A live demo is available at: http://kb1.cse.ohio-state.edu:8123/
events/threat
Named Entity Example Tweet Existence Severity
apple RT AsturSec: A kernel vulnerability in Apple devices gives access to remote code
execution - Packt Hub #infosec #CyberSecurity https://t....
0.96 0.59
google RT binitamshah: Unfixed spoofing vulnerability in Google Inbox mobile apps
https://t.co/TWx7jSi1gc
0.78 0.17
adobe RT Anomali: Adobe released patches for three “important-ranked” severity vul-
nerabilities, including one vulnerability in Adobe Acrobat and...
0.76 0.32
flash Vulnerability in Flash player allowing code execution. Patch before Black Friday:
https://t.co/4idb570d1E #CyberSecurity #vulnerability
0.71 0.43
mac adobe’s flash player for windows, mac and linux has a critical vulnerability that
should be patched as a top priori... https://t.co/LLlPATy9vR
0.69 0.88
Table 3: Top five threats extracted with highest confidence on Nov. 22, 2018. For each entity we aggregate tweets,
and average threat existence scores. The tweet with the maximum threat severity score is shown in each instance.
Figure 3: Precision/Recall curves showing perfor-
mances of convolutional model (CNN) and logistic re-
gression model (LR) for threat severity classification
task in test set.
Features Weight Features Weight
ddos attack 1.40 〈TARGET〉 , 0.89
hackers to 1.11 take over 0.87
a massive 1.07 00 countries 0.85
critical vulnerability 1.03 attackers to 0.84
0 billion 0.96 discovered in 0.82
lets attackers 0.95 000 million 0.82
〈TARGET〉 users 0.91 : #ddos 0.81
a critical 0.91 abuse and 0.81
of a 0.89 , ddos 0.81
many 〈TARGET〉 0.89 a severe 0.79
Table 4: High-weight n-gram features from logistic re-
gression model for threat severity classification task.
Task Model Dev AUC Test AUC
Existence LR 0.88 0.85
Severity LR 0.62 0.54CNN 0.70 0.65
Table 5: Performance of our threat existence and sever-
ity classifiers. We show area under the precision-recall
curve (AUC) for both development and test sets.
on their severity?
A large corpus of users’ opinions: We follow
the same procedure described in Section 2.1 to
prepare another dataset for a large-scale evalua-
tion. For this purpose, we collected data from Jan
2016 to Nov 2017; this ensures no tweets over-
lap with those that were annotated in Section 2.2.
We collect all English tweets that explicitly con-
tain the keyword “vulnerability” within this time
period, which results in a total number of 976,180
tweets. 377,468 tweets remain after removing
tweets without named entities.
National Vulnerability Database (NVD): NVD
is the U.S. government database of software vul-
nerabilities. Started in 2000, NVD covers over
100,000 vulnerabilities, assigning a unique CVE
number for each threat. These CVE numbers serve
as common identifiers. NVD uses the Common
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) to measure
the severity of threats. CVSS currently has two
versions: CVSS v2.0 and CVSS v3.0 standards.
CVSS v3.0 is the latest version released in July
2015. We summarize the two standards in Ta-
ble 6.9
Severity Base Score Severity Base Score
None 0.0
Low 0.0-3.9 Low 0.1-3.9
Medium 4.0-6.9 Medium 4.0-6.9
High 7.0-10.0 High 7.0-8.9
Critical 9.0-10.0
Table 6: Qualitative severity rankings of vulnerabilities
in NVD. (Left) CVSS v2.0 standards and (Right) CVSS
v3.0 standards.
Matching tweets with NVD records: Evaluat-
ing our forecasts of high severity vulnerabilities
9
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss
relies on accurately matching tweets describing
vulnerabilities to their associated NVD records.
To achieve this we present a simple, yet effective
method that makes use of content in linked web-
pages. We find that 82.4% of tweets contain exter-
nal urls in our dataset.
Our approach to link tweets to CVEs is to search
for CVE numbers either in url addresses or in
corresponding web pages linked in tweets report-
ing vulnerabilities.10 We ignore web pages that
contain more than one unique CVE to avoid po-
tential ambiguities. Using this approach, within
our dataset, 79,383 tweets were linked to 10,565
unique CVEs. In order to stimulate a forecasting
scenario, we only consider CVEs where more than
two associated tweets were posted at least 5 days
ahead of official NVD publication date. In our
dataset, 13,942 tweets are finally selected for fore-
cast evaluation, covering 1,409 unique CVE num-
bers. To evaluate the accuracy of this linking pro-
cedure, we randomly sampled 100 matched pairs
and manually checked them. We find the precision
of our matching procedure to be very high: only 2
mismatches out of 100 are found.
3.1 Forecasting Models
Now that we have a linking between tweets and
CVE numbers, our goal is to produce a sorted list
of CVEs with those that are indicated to be severe
threats the top. We consider two ranking proce-
dures, detailed below; the first is based on users’
opinions toward the severity of a threat, and the
second is a baseline that simply uses the volume of
tweets describing a specific vulnerability to mea-
sure its severity. To simplify the exposition below,
we denote each CVE number as CVEi, and the
collection of tweets linked to this CVE number as
TCVEi = {k|tweet tk is mapped to CVEi}.
Our model: Our severe threat classifier assigns
a severity score pseverity(y|〈e, t〉) for each tuple of
name entity e and corresponding tweet t. For a
specific CVE, we define our severity forecast score
to be the maximum severity scores among all tu-
ples from matched tweets 〈·, tk〉 (a single tweet
10 Readers may be wondering why a CVE number has been
generated before it is officially published in the database.
This is due to the mechanism of assigning CVEs. Some iden-
tified companies have the right to assign CVEs or have al-
ready reversed some CVEs. When a threat appears, a CVE
number is assigned immediately before any further evalua-
tion. NVD only officially publishes a threat after all evalua-
tions are completed. Therefore, there is a time delay between
CVE entry established date and the official publication date.
may contain more than one name entity):
(CVEi)forecast score = max
k∈TCVEi
pseverity(y|〈·, tk〉).
Tweet volume baseline: Intuitively, the number
of tweets and retweets can indicate people’s con-
cern about a specific event. Specifically, the sever-
ity for threat CVEi according to the volume model
is defined by the cardinality of TCVEi :
(CVEi)volume score = |TCVEi |.
3.2 Forecasting CVSS Ratings
In our first set of experiments, we compare our
forecasted threat severity scores against CVSS rat-
ings from the NVD. We define a threat as being
severe if its CVSS score is≥ 7.0. This cut-off cor-
responds to qualitative severity ratings provided
by CVSS (marked as HIGH or CRITICAL in Ta-
ble 6).11 We use the newest v3.0 scoring system,
which was developed to improve v2.0.12 Large
software vendors have announced of the adapta-
tion of the CVSS v3.0 standards, including Cisco,
Oracle, SUSE Linux, and RedHat.
We evaluate our models’ performance at identi-
fying severe threats five days ahead of the NVD
publication date, within their top k predictions.
Table 7 shows our results. We observe that tweet
volume performs better than a random baseline;
having a large number of tweets beforehand is a
good indicator for high severity, however our ap-
proach which analyzes the content of messages
discussing software vulnerabilities achieves sig-
nificantly better performance; 86% of its top 50
forecasts were indeed rated as HIGH or CRITI-
CAL severity in the NVD.
P@10 P@50 P@100 AUC
Random 59.0 61.2 58.8 0.595
Volume model 70.0 68.0 70.0 0.583
Our model 100.0 86.0 78.0 0.658
Table 7: Model performance of identifying severe
threats (CVSS scores ≥ 7.0) with Precision@k and
area under the precision-recall curve (AUC) metrics.
For majority random baseline, we average over 10
trails.
11The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams
(FIRST) also provides an example guideline that recom-
mends patching all vulnerabilities with CVSS scores ≥ 7.0.
See https://www.first.org/cvss/cvss-based-patch-policy.pdf.
12
https://www.first.org/cvss/user-guide
CVE Num /
Name Entity
CVE Description / Matched Tweets CVSS Scores /
Our Severity
Publish Date
(# Days Ahead)
(a)
CVE-2016-0728 The join session keyring function in security/keys/process keys.c in the Linux ker-
nel before 4.4.1 mishandles object references in a certain error case, which allows
local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (integer overflow and
use-after-free) via crafted keyctl commands.
7.2 HIGH (v2.0)
7.8 HIGH (v3.0)
2016-02-08
Android Vulnerability in the Linux kernel could allow attackers to gain access to millions
of Android devices! http://thenextweb.com/insider/2016/01/20/newly-discovered-
security-flaw-could-let-hackers-control-66-of-all-android-devices/ ...
0.98 2016-01-20 (+19)
Android A Serious Vulnerability in the Linux Kernel Hits Millions of PCs, Servers and
Android Devices http://ift.tt/1OvB4JA
0.89 2016-01-20 (+19)
Android Millions of PCs and Android devices are at risk from a recently discovered critical
zero-day vulnerability. http://goo.gl/r95ZYZ #infosec
0.89 2016-01-20 (+19)
(b)
CVE-2017-6753 A vulnerability in Cisco WebEx browser extensions for Google Chrome and
Mozilla Firefox could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbi-
trary code with the privileges of the affected browser on an affected system.
9.3 HIGH (v2.0)
8.8 HIGH (v3.0)
2017-07-25
Cisco WebEx Ex-
tensions
The Hacker News : Critical RCE Vulnerability Found in Cisco WebEx Extensions,
Again - Patch Now! http://ow.ly/gR3l30dJXlj #CDTTweets
0.98 2017-07-19 (+6)
Cisco Systems A critical vulnerability has been discovered in the Cisco Systems’ WebEx browser
extension for #Chrome and #Firefox: http://s.cgvpn.net/Zu
0.94 2017-07-18 (+7)
Cisco WebEx Ex-
tensions
“Critical RCE Vulnerability Found in Cisco WebEx Extensions, Again - Patch
Now!” via The Hacker News #security http://ift.tt/2va8Wrx
0.93 2017-07-17 (+8)
(c)
CVE-2016-5195 Race condition in mm/gup.c in the Linux kernel 2.x through 4.x before 4.8.3 allows
local users to gain privileges by leveraging incorrect handling of a copy-on-write
(COW) feature to write to a read-only memory mapping, as exploited in the wild
in October 2016, aka “Dirty COW.”
7.2 HIGH (v2.0)
7.8 HIGH (v3.0)
2016-11-10
Linux Serious Dirty COW bug leaves millions of Linux users vulnerable to attack: A
vulnerability discovered in the ... http://tinyurl.com/zjdp268
0.97 2016-10-22 (+19)
Linux OS A critical vulnerability has been discovered in all versions of the Linux OS and is
being exploited in the wild http://ift.tt/2es31Xc
0.95 2016-10-25 (+16)
Linux COW Serious vulnerability found in the Linux COW, may have persisted for a decade.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-37728010?ocid=socialflow twitter ...
http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/10/most-serious-linux-privilege-escalation-
bug-ever-is-under-active-exploit/ ...
0.82 2016-10-21 (+20)
(d)
CVE-2016-7855 Use-after-free vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player before 23.0.0.205 on Windows
and OS X and before 11.2.202.643 on Linux allows remote attackers to execute
arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, as exploited in the wild in October 2016.
10.0 HIGH (v2.0)
9.8 CRITICAL (v3.0)
2016-11-01
Flash ICYMI Critical vulnerability found in Flash, being actively exploited. Patch Flash
NOW https://www.grahamcluley.com/patch-flash/
0.97 2016-10-27 (+5)
Adobe Adobe has released a Flash Player update to patch a critical vulnerability that ma-
licious actors have been ex... http://bit.ly/2eaTxhO
0.95 2016-10-26 (+6)
Adobe Flash
Player
A critical vulnerability for Adobe Flash Player that allows an attacker to take
control of the affected system. https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-
player/apsb16-36.html ...
0.80 2016-10-27 (+5)
Table 8: Top 4 threats identified by our forecast model. Severity scores are generated by using threat severity
classifier in Section 2.3.
Table 8 presents top 4 forecast results from our
model. We observe that our model can predict ac-
curate severity level even 19 days ahead of the of-
ficial published date in NVD (Table 8(a), (c)).
3.3 Predicting Real-World Exploits
In addition to comparing our forecasted sever-
ity scores against CVSS, as described above, we
also explored several alternatives suggested by
the security community to evaluate our methods:
(1) Symantec’s anti-virus (AV) signatures13 and
intrusion-protection (IPS) signatures,14 in addition
to (2) Exploit Database (EDB).15
Sabottke et al. (2015) suggested Symantec’s AV
and IPS signatures are the best available indicator
13
https://www.symantec.com/security-center/a-z
14
https://www.symantec.com/security response/attacksignatures/
15
https://www.exploit-db.com/
for real exploitable threats in the wild. We fol-
low their method of explicitly querying for CVE
numbers from the descriptions of signatures to
generate exploited threats ground truth. Exploit
Database (EDB) is an archive of public exploits
and software vulnerabilities. We query EDB for
all threats that have been linked into NVD.16 In
total we gathered 134 CVEs verified by Symantec
and EDB to be real exploits within the 1,409 CVEs
used in our forecasting evaluation.
We evaluate the number of exploited threats
identified within our top ranked CVEs. Table 9
presents our results. We observe that 7 of top 10
threats from our model were exploited in the wild.
We also observe that for the actual CVSS v3.0
scores, only 1 out of the top 10 vulnerabilities was
16
http://cve.mitre.org/data/refs/refmap/source-EXPLOIT-DB.html
exploited.
Top 10 Top 50 Top 100
P R P R P R
True CVSS 10.0 0.7 16.0 6.0 16.0 11.9
Volume model 60.0 4.5 22.0 8.2 19.0 14.2
Our model 70.0 5.2 28.0 10.4 21.0 15.7
Table 9: Model performance against real-world ex-
ploited threats identified by Symantec and Exploit-DB.
“True CVSS” refers to ranking CVEs based on actual
CVSS scores in NVD. This model is only for reference
and can not be used in real practice, as we do not know
true CVSS scores when forecasting.
3.4 Identifying Accounts that Post Reliable
Warnings
Finally we perform an analysis of the reliability
of individual Twitter accounts. We evaluate all
accounts with more than 5 tweets exceeding 0.5
confidence score from our severity classifier. Ta-
ble 10 presents our results. Accounts in our data
whose warnings were found to have highest preci-
sion when compared against CVSS include “@se-
curityaffairs” and “@EduardKovacs”, which are
known to post security related information, and
both have more than 10k followers.
Account Name # Corr / # Fcst Acc. (%)
jburnsconsult 15 / 15 100
securityaffairs 10 / 10 100
EduardKovacs 6 / 6 100
cripperz 5 / 5 100
cipherstorm 4 / 5 80
Table 10: List of users with top accuracies on forecast-
ing severe cybersecurity threats.
4 Related Work
There is a long history of prior work on analyz-
ing users’ opinions online (Wiebe et al., 2004), a
large body of prior work has focused on sentiment
analysis (Pang et al., 2002; Rosenthal et al., 2015),
e.g., determining whether a message is positive or
negative. In this paper we developed annotated
corpora and classifiers to analyze users’ opinions
toward the severity of cybersecurity threats re-
ported online, as far as we are aware this is the
first work to explore this direction.
Forecasting real-world exploits is a topic of in-
terest in the security community. For example,
Bozorgi et al. (2010) train SVM classifiers to rank
the exploitability of threats. Several studies have
also predicted CVSS scores from various sources
including text descriptions in NVD (Han et al.,
2017; Bullough et al., 2017).
Prior work has also explored a variety of fore-
casting methods that incorporate textual evidence
(Smith, 2010), including the use of Twitter mes-
sage content to forecast influenza rates (Paul et al.,
2014), predicting the propagation of social media
posts based on their content (Tan et al., 2014) and
forecasting election outcomes (O’Connor et al.,
2010; Swamy et al., 2017).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the first study of the
connections between the severity of cybersecurity
threats and language that is used to describe them
online. We annotate a corpus of 6,000 tweets
describing software vulnerabilities with authors’
opinions toward their severity, and demonstrated
that our corpus supports the development of auto-
matic classifiers with high precision for this task.
Furthermore, we demonstrate the value of analyz-
ing users’ opinions about the severity of threats
reported online as an early indicator of important
software vulnerabilities. We presented a simple,
yet effective method for linking software vulnera-
bilities reported in tweets to Common Vulnerabil-
ities and Exposures (CVEs) in the National Vul-
nerability Database (NVD). Using our predicted
severity scores, we show that it is possible to
achieve a Precision@50 of 0.86 when forecasting
high severity vulnerabilities, significantly outper-
forming a baseline that is based on tweet volume.
Finally we showed how reports of severe vulnera-
bilities online are predictive of real-world exploits.
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A Linking Algorithm
We describe our approach to match tweets with
NVD records in full detail in Algorithm 1.
B Limitations of CVSS and Real-World
Exploits Ground Truth
In Section 3.2 - Section 3.3, we compare our fore-
cast results with (1) CVSS ratings, and (2) real ex-
ploited threats identified by Symantec signatures
and Exploit Database. Each of these sources of
17If a tweet or its associate urls explicitly contains a CVE
number, then we ignore this maximum time range constraint.
Algorithm 1 Linking tweets to NVD records.
1: // Linking
2: for every tweet t do
3: if CVE number in tweet context or in url links then
4: match CVEs to this tweet
5: else
6: query webpage contents to search for CVEs
7:
8: // Check linking results
9: Keep tweets that matched to only one unique CVE to
avoid ambiguities
10:
11: // Apply time constraints
12: Select out tweets that are posted at least 5 days ahead of
official NVD publication date (at most 365 days17)
ground truth have limitations, which we discuss
below.
CVSS ratings are widely used as standard in-
dicators for risk measurement in practice. How-
ever, one problem of CVSS ratings is that high
severity threats do not necessarily lead to real-
world exploits. Allodi and Massacci (2012) show
that only a small portion (around 2%) of reported
vulnerabilities were found to be exploited in the
wild. Furthermore, more than half of the threats in
NVD are marked as HIGH or CRITICAL, causing
a large burden on vendors to fix.18 We also no-
tice these CVSS scores are closely tied with spe-
cific categories of threats. For example, 85.6% of
buffer errors are marked as HIGH or CRITICAL,
while 72.5% of information leaks were marked
as MEDIUM or LOW. All these issues post chal-
lenges on how to prioritize real exploitable threats,
with the goal of reducing false positives and false
negatives simultaneously. Our work provides one
such additional source of information for helping
to prioritize threats.
The ground truth we use for real exploited
threats is still an incomplete list. For example,
Linux kernel vulnerabilities are less likely to ap-
pear in Symantec signatures, as Symantec does not
have a security product for Linux. Identifying real
exploited threats is a difficult task; to the best of
our knowledge, there does not exist an easy-to-
access list covering all exploited threats currently.
C Additional Analysis of Results
In this section, we present further analyses of peo-
ple’s online behaviors when discussing cybersecu-
rity threats on social media.
We find that the real severity of threats is pre-
18
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cvssv3-when-every-vulnerability-appears-to-be-high-priority/
CVE Num Name Entity Tweet Our Score Real Severity
(a) CVE-2017-4984 EMC VNX1VNX2
OE
threatmeter: Vuln: EMC VNX1/VNX2 OE for File CVE-2017-4984 Remote
Code Execution Vulnerability http://ift.tt/2rWXQXa
0.01 10.0 HIGH (v2.0)
9.8 CRITICAL (v3.0)
(b) CVE-2016-1730 iPhone A newly discovered vulnerability may expose iPhone users to attack whenusing a Wi-Fi hotspot - via @InfosecurityMag http://owl.li/Xw3VO
0.76 5.8 MEDIUM (v2.0)
5.4 MEDIUM (v3.0)
iPhone Apple iOS Flaw Enables Attacks via Hotspot: The vulnerability opens up
iPhone users to a raft of problems, inc... http://bit.ly/1JqGtD9
0.45
Table 11: Some examples of forecast errors made by our model. (a) False negative examples: there is no clear
language clue for demonstrating the severity of threats, experts are needed for threats of this kind. (b) False positive
examples: there exist some signals captured by our model for being severe threats, but actual severity might be
overestimated.
dictable based on users’ opinions online. We ob-
serve several repeated patterns in how people de-
scribe severe threats. We summarize some of these
patterns below:
• describing severity levels (see Ap-
pendix C.1), such as “critical”, “serious”,
“highly”;
• describing the number of users or devices af-
fected, such as “millions of 〈TARGET〉 de-
vices”, “huge number of”;
• potential consequences, such as “allows
hackers to”, “could allow for remote code ex-
ecution”, “malware”;
• alerts or warnings, such as “please be aware”,
“warning”;
• suggesting immediate actions, such as “patch
now”.
C.1 Usage of Subjective Adjectives
We notice people rely on adjectives for describing
the level of severity for threats, rather than numer-
ical scores. These subjective adjectives form our
initial impressions on these threats.
We examine subjective adjectives people use for
measuring threats. We run POS tagging to extract
all tokens marked as JJ, JJP, and JJS. We then
rank subjective adjectives in Subjectivity Lexicon
(SUB) (Wilson et al., 2005) by log-odds ratio of
their occurrences in NVD descriptions for HIGH
or CRITICAL threats versus MEDIUM or LOW
threats. Table 12 presents top ranked subjective
adjectives. We observe variants people are using
for severe threats, e.g. “serious”, “severe”, “mali-
cious”, etc.
C.2 Temporal Analysis
We collect all CVEs having matched tweets posted
at least 1 day ahead of the official NVD publica-
tion date, resulting in a set of 3,678 CVEs. Within
our dataset, 84.7% of CVEs are reported within 60
days after the first disclosure on social media. We
Adj. Ratio Adj. Ratio Adj. Ratio
serious 2.01 aware 1.61 fast 1.39
pivotal 1.95 most 1.61 original 1.39
sure 1.95 vivid 1.61 able 1.39
free 1.95 accessible 1.39 blind 1.39
active 1.79 popular 1.39 arbitrary 1.35
intelligent 1.79 deep 1.39 high 1.30
static 1.79 black 1.39 incomplete 1.25
critical 1.67 top 1.39 malicious 1.20
severe 1.61 dangerous 1.39 wily 1.10
great 1.61 wild 1.39 evil 1.10
Table 12: Top ranked log-odds ratio of subjective ad-
jectives describing severe threats (CVSS scores ≥ 7.0)
versus non-severe threats (CVSS scores < 7.0). Sub-
jective adjectives are identified by using Subjectivity
Lexicon (SUB) (Wilson et al., 2005).
observe a median of 5 days delay in our dataset,
whereas some of threats have significant longer
delays. For example, CVE-2016-212319 (Over-
flow Remote Code Execution Vulnerability) first
appears at Twitter on Dec. 19, 201620, but is pub-
lished in NVD on Nov. 1, 2018. It again shows the
difficulty of threat evaluation and management.
C.3 Error Analysis
We evaluate two types of errors with respect to
forecasting high severity vulnerabilities: false pos-
itive and false negative examples. We observe that
some severe threats are difficult to predict based
on contents in general, such as Table 11(a). There
is no clear clue for estimating the severity level
merely on tweet contents.
We present another incorrect example extracted
by our forecast system in Table 11(b). We notice
tokens like “expose users to attack”, “opens up to a
raft of problems”, etc. This threat does seem to be
exploitable and harmful to a lot of users. However,
experts mark it as of medium severity. It might
be the case that the actual severity level of some
threats are overestimated by some accounts.
19
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2123
20
https://twitter.com/ryf feed/status/810981102768758784
